



ICT-enabled
integration facilitator
and life rebuilding guidance

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REBUILD

ICT-enabled integration facilitator and life rebuilding guidance

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report is the third one dedicated to the impact assessment of the REBUILD project and of its main outputs. It supports the definition of the ex-ante scenario for the impact assessment, *i.e.* the situation without REBUILD. For developing such a scenario, beside the work carried out in previous reports (D9.2), two main research activities have been carried out:

- the analysis of the costs of non-integration of migrant and refugees and
- the analysis of the impacts, already visible and expected, on REBUILD partners organisations, more specifically on those partners that play the role of Local Service Providers (LSPs) or that facilitate

With reference to the first point, the report proposes an in-depth analysis of different and complementary costs that States have to cover as a consequence of integration failure: *i.e.* cost of imprisonment, cost of unemployment benefits, cost of migrants' healthcare, cost of low educational performance for migrant students, cost of discrimination and cost of reception.

The analysis presented in this report shows that the costs for a migrant that is not properly integrated in the host society can be as high as 52,000 Euro per Year for a single person, reaching 5 billion Euro of costs considering the whole migrant population.

An important disclaimer on the above figures is needed with reference to the level of analysis. This report maps the cost of non-integration with reference to the Italian case and offers some reflection on the situation in the other two pilot countries (Spain and Greece). It has been taken into account that the costs estimated for Italy may not be fully aligned with the overall costs in the other two pilot countries and it has been specified considering the difference in GDP, National Health Expenditure and National Education Expenditure.

With reference to the second point: the impact on REBUILD partners, the research carried out shows that positive impacts are already visible. Interviewed organisations report an increase in staff competencies, visibility, and competitiveness of their organisations and increased collaboration at local and international level. The integration of the REBUILD socio-technical solution is expected to provide positive results in terms of organisation's efficiency and it is expected to increase the effectiveness of the offered services. Moreover the REBUILD socio-technical tool is seen as an instrument not only for offering better services to migrants and refugees, but also to innovate other sectors and service of the organisations.

This report supports a deeper analysis of the situation before the introduction of the REBUILD outputs in the working routines of LSPs and will be followed by a deeper analysis of impacts in the next phases of project development. Indeed the data gathering for the final impact assessment report will follow the testing phase and will consider both the impact on the LSPs partners of REBUILD, as well as other LSPs engaged in the testing and, finally, the impact on final users (*i.e.* migrants and refugees).



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INTRODUCTION

The project REBUILD aims at improving migrants and refugees' inclusion through the provision of a toolbox of ICT-based solutions aimed to enhance both the effectiveness of the services provided by local public administration and organizations, and the life quality of the migrants.

This project follows a user-centered and participatory design approach, aiming at addressing properly real target users' needs, ethical and cross-cultural dimensions, and at monitoring and validating the socio-economic impact of the proposed solution. Both target groups (immigrants/refugees and local public services providers) will be part of a continuous design process; users and stakeholders' engagement is a key success factor addressed both in the Consortium composition and in its capacity to engage relevant stakeholders external to the project. Users will be engaged since the beginning of the project through interviews and focus groups; then will be part of the application design, participating in three Co-Creation Workshops organized in the three main piloting countries: Italy, Spain and Greece, chosen for their being the "access gates" to Europe for main immigration routes. Then again, in the 2nd and 3rd years of the project, users' engagement in Test and Piloting events in the three target countries, will help the Consortium fine-tune the REBUILD ICT toolbox before the end of the project.

The key technology solutions proposed are:

- GDPR-compliant migrants' integration related background information gathering with user consent and anonymization of personal information;
- AI-based profile analysis to enable both personalized support and policy making on migration-related issues;
- AI-based needs matching tool, to match migrant needs and skills with services provided by local authorities in EU countries and labour market needs at local and regional level;
- a Digital Companion for migrants enabling personalized two-way communication using chatbots to provide them smart support for easy access to local services (training, health, employment, welfare, etc.) and assessment of the level of integration and understanding of the new society, while providing to local authorities data-driven, easy to use decision supporting tools for enhancing capacities and effectiveness in service provision.

In this context, the aim of this deliverable is twofold: first analyse the costs of non-integration of migrants and refugees in order to better contextualise the potential benefits of REBUILD in terms of cost saving for public administration; secondly to report a preliminary assessment of REBUILD's actual and expected impacts on REBUILD partners acting as Local service Providers (LSPs): Uninettuno, Cidas, Omnes, UAB and MDAT.

Consequently, this deliverable is structured as follows:

Chapter 1 briefly summarises the methodology for impact assessment described in D9.1.

Chapter 2 describes the costs of non-integration of migrants and refugees.

Chapter 3 reports the preliminary results in terms of expected impact on Local Service Providers (LSPs) partners of REBUILD elaborating on the interviews conducted with them.

Chapter 4 ends the report with main comments and timing for next steps.



1. REBUILD IMPACT ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK AT A GLANCE

As it has been previously described in D9.1 and D9.2 the REBUILD impact assessment framework follows a mixed method approach including both qualitative and quantitative socio-economic methods. Such a framework is based on state-of-the-art methods of impact assessment and follows the impact value chain approach.

In order to map all the potential impacts of the REBUILD project and taking into consideration its expected outputs, the methodological framework has been articulated in three layers. They will consider, using ad hoc dimensions and sub-dimensions, the following:

- The impacts of the REBUILD socio-technical tool on migrants and refugees
- The impacts of the REBUILD socio-technical tool on Public Administrations (PAs) and other actors acting as Local Service Providers (LSPs)
- The impact of REBUILD as a project on citizens and the whole society.

The first layers cannot be considered at the time of writing because the REBUILD socio-technical solution is still under development and the test with stakeholders and users did not start yet. Therefore, this report considers the second layer, in particular the impacts on REBUILD partners acting as LSPs (UNINETTUNO; OMNES and CIDAS) or facilitating the engagement of LSPs (such as UAB and MDAT).

For this, the areas of impact and dimensions considered are the in figure 1.




Figure 1: REBUILD Impact Assessment Framework: socio-technical tool expected impact on LSPs and PAs

The areas of impact and dimensions have been defined in D9.1 as described below.

Social impact

It covers the impact generated by the REBUILD socio-technical tool within the LSPs organisations which could be:

- An improvement on the *workforce human capital* by improving their digital literacy thanks to the digitalization of their service and the consequence it will have on their daily activities and the acquisition (or improvement) of other non-technical skills to be defined on a case by case way considering the specific service and user scenario under assessment.



Re_Build

- An increase in collaboration and networking: thanks to the REBUILD socio-technical tool LSPs are expected to be able to enlarge their professional network, increase the quantity and quality of exchanges and collaboration with other LSPs.
- An improvement in the *workforce working conditions*: social workers and, more generally, persons working in the provision of services to migrants are often overworked, quickly changing legislation puts them under pressure with the constant need to adjust to new conditions and requirements, often with few structural support measures. REBUILD is expected to reduce the complexity of their everyday work, support them in finding the information needed to better support migrants and reduce the number of requests reaching them by providing migrants with the information that they would otherwise ask to LSPs. This is expected to generate a positive impact in terms of perceived efficacy and quality of their job.

Economic impact

This dimension and associated sub-dimensions consider all the relevant economic results that REBUILD tools could imply for LSPs and is based on the econometric literature on ICT diffusion, that has traditionally identified a number of economic effects of digitalization such as efficiency and productivity growth (OECD 2004; Evangelista, et al., 2014). This dimension will consider economic impacts that can be expressed in monetary terms (such as cost saving and time saving), but also impacts that cannot be expressed in monetary terms but that, nevertheless, are good indicators of potential economic growth (i.e. competitiveness).

The sub-dimensions that will be considered are, therefore, the following:

- *Impact on efficiency* which will be measured looking at the cost-saving and time saving aspect generated by the REBUILD socio-technical tool
- *Impact on internal working routine & work processes* considering the qualitative changes in the everyday way of working on LSPs employees that might not result directly in time saving and cost saving but that are equally relevant in the life of an organisation such as reduction of bureaucracy, reduction in the duplication of data gathering and data storage activities and increment in accountability and transparency.
- *Impact on competitiveness* generated by the digitalisation of the LSPs services which could lead to higher visibility at local and international level and positive perceptions in terms of organisation innovativeness.

Political impact

This impact area of the framework introduced a slight change in perspective. Indeed, the other areas and dimensions consider: a) as main stakeholders LSPs as organisations working directly with migrants and their employees and b) the REBUILD socio-technical characteristic in its component of information and service delivery to migrants. When considering the political impact area, however, we focus on decision and policy makers and migrants' services designers (being members of the PAs or also LSPs organisations). In parallel, from a technological point of view, we look at the capability of the REBUILD socio-technical tool to provide firsthand, reliable data to those actors in order for them to deliver evidence-based policies. Indeed, an important feature of the REBUILD socio-technical tool is data analytics that will be able to provide insights based on service usage and users-generated information.

This is expected to impact on:

- the political agenda setting at local, national, and international level
- the generation of new policies
- the quality of existing and new policies
- the institutions, promoting, when useful, institutional changes.

Clearly, this dimension will become more relevant in the next phases of the REBUILD project, but we investigate in this deliverable the perceived relevance of the various dimensions and the expectations in terms of impact in the long run.

Technological impact

As for the previous area of impact, but at a different level of analysis, REBUILD socio-technical tool is expected to provide LSPs with more and qualitatively improved information. This can take the form of feedback on their service provision, of information on users' needs and expectations and can help the organisation in better planning their activities and processes.

This area of impact will investigate, also, to what extent the digitisation process implied by the REBUILD socio-technical tool on dedicated services, will lead to further technological investments and innovation in LSPs organisations. The REBUILD tool will, in fact, facilitate access to a certain number of services, but this can create a cascade effect at local level, pushing organisations, partners (or not partners) of REBUILD, to link their services to REBUILD. At the same time, within a given organisation, the REBUILD tool could push for the digitalisation of other services asking for ad hoc investments or for the improvement and update of already-existing e-services.

Summarising, the dimensions covered in this area of impact are:

- Impact on service digitalisation
- Impact on access to information

Moreover, the REBUILD impact assessment framework is based on the comparison between the situation without the REBUILD outputs with the situation after the REBUILD implementation (ex-post, contrafactual scenario). In D9.2 a preliminary analysis of the ex-ante situation at country level with reference to the migration topic has been conducted, in this deliverable we expand the ex-ante scenario by adding more information on the state-of-the-art of REBUILD partners as LSPs. Adding to this, this deliverable develops a complementary counterfactual scenario, considering the economic costs of migrant NON integration in the hosting countries. Such a scenario can be useful in the future of the REBUILD project, when considering its exploitation and the potential needed investments for its full deployment. Indeed, such a counterfactual scenario represents the core of this report and is reported in chapter 2, while chapter 3 is dedicated to the actual and expected impact on REBUILD partners acting as LSPs or facilitating their engagement.

2 THE COSTS OF NON-INTEGRATION OF MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES: FRAMEWORK AND INDICATORS

The cost of non-integration of migrants may pose a challenge to the economy of a country. The non-integration economic scenario that will be explored in this chapter takes into account all the costs that a State is in charge of related to that part of the migrant population who struggles to integrate.

Non-integration costs can create a threat to the socio-economic system if the percentage of unemployment becomes unsustainable, if more irregular migrants start to be involved in criminal activity or if they end up in imprisonment; not only marginalisation but also isolation is considered an indirect effect of non-integration with final aggravation of the socio-cultural scenario.

This chapter considers five dimensions relevant for estimating the cost of non-integration:

- The cost of Unemployment Benefits
- The cost of Immigration Imprisonment
- The cost of Low Educational Performance in High school for migrants and second-generation students
- Migrants' Healthcare cost and the cost of exclusion from Healthcare, referred to Irregular migrants' healthcare assistance
- The cost of discrimination

2.1 THE COSTS OF NON-INTEGRATION OF MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES

International scientific research states that the non-integration of migrants means high economic, socio-cultural, and political costs in the long run (Ryan, 2019; OECD, 2018; Danzer, 2012). The report considers different possible scenarios of non-integration outputs from incapability to find a job aligned with the migrant competences, to the more severe consequence of non-integration such as deviant behaviours that might end in criminal carriers. There are also other costs such as the cost of low educational performance of migrant children (OECD, 2019; Crul, 2012; Belfield, 2008) which have a serious impact on the employment of young adults; the costs of low integration of migrant women into the labour market due to the care duties within families (Liebig and Tronstad, 2015; Kofman, 2012) and other indirect costs of non-integration.

The analysis that follows shows figures based on Italian public budgets and national statistics. As mentioned in chapter one, the aim of this report is to model a cost analysis for migrant non-integration in one of the REBUILD pilot countries and consider, in the last chapter of this report, eventual differences with the other two pilot countries (Spain and Greece). Moreover, more than a punctual analysis of specific non-integration costs, this report aims to develop a model for further studies in the sector and reach an estimation on the order of magnitude of such costs.

2.2 THE COST OF IMPRISONMENT¹

According to the official statistics of the Italian Ministry of Justice, on average, 20,000 foreigners have been imprisoned every year over the last ten years. As it is shown in the figure 2, there were 17,340 people imprisoned in 2105 and 19,888 in 2019. On the one hand, from 2015-2019 the number has remained almost stable, with an

¹ Imprisonment here considered is not referred to the Immigration Detention Centers but to an imprisoned person who is in national jails (*i.e.* for one day or more) because he/she has committed a crime or is waiting for a judgement.

increase of about 2,000 people; on the other hand, considering the years 2010-2019 there has been a significant slight decrease of about 5,000 people from 24,954 people in 2010 up to 19,888 in 2019.




Figure 2: Number of imprisoned foreigners 2010-2019

Elaboration on official data: https://www.giustizia.it/giustizia/it/mg_1_14.page

At the end of the 2019, the total number of foreign convicts was 19,888 (32,73%) out of a total of 60,769 convicts; with a small decrease compared to 2018 when foreign convicts represented 33,95% of the total number of convicts (see figure 3).




Figure 3: Imprisoned people by nationality

Elaboration on official Data https://www.giustizia.it/giustizia/it/mg_1_14.page

Out of 20,000 non-Italian convicts, the number of imprisoned women was 2,576 at the end of December 2018 and of 2,663 at the end of 2019 (about 4% of the total).

According to the official report on the condition of imprisonments (Miravalle, 2018) the estimated budget of the Penitential Administration for 2018 has been circa 2 billion Euro. 80% of the total budget covered personnel costs and penitential police. The daily cost for the support and maintenance of each convict has been about 137,00 Euro. From 2018 to 2019, the shift in this cost has been slight, and at the end of April 2019, the daily amount was about 131,00 Euro. Assuming that in 2019, the cost would be almost constant, the annual costs have been estimated on a daily basis: considering 131,00 Euro for 20,000 foreigners imprisoned for 365 days, the total cost of imprisonment was almost 1 billion Euro, which will be accounted in this report (see chapter 3) as the total statal

budget for the maintenance of the foreigner convicts. To estimate the medium budget over the past five years, it is assumed that the daily cost remained almost constant (131,00 Euro) over the years 2015-2019. The annual costs estimated is shown in figure 4 approximately , more than 3 Billion Euro has been spent over five years so distributed: 829,112,100 Million in 2015; 890,363,115 in 2016; 944,107,175 in 2018; 968,849,825 in 2018; 950,944,720 in 2019. On average, 19,169 foreigners were imprisoned in the years 2015-2019, the total medium budget for five years was about 920 million Euro per year. Out of a total of 95,849 imprisoned foreigners, more than a total of 4 billion Euro have been spent to support the daily cost over the years 2015-2019.




Figure 4: Annual Cost of Imprisonment (2015-2019) and Number of foreigners imprisoned per year
Elaboration on official data: https://www.giustizia.it/giustizia/it/mg_1_14.page

In the near future, the cost of imprisonment is expected to continue to rise. The plan of the Ministry of Finance and Economy (MEF) shows that a large amount of it will cover the penitential administration costs. If we look at the figure 5 we can clearly see that the penitential administration cost is higher than the other costs in 2019: much of the state funds were for the penal and civil Justice (58,8%) and for the Penitentiary Administration (34,43%), Community and Juvenile Justice (3,18%), Services for justice administrations (2,32%), Political costs (0,52%), Other administrative services (0,77%). It is not possible to assess how much of this cost is related to the management of cases related to non-Italian people, so that we will focus the analysis only on the costs of imprisonment with the assumption that they are lower than the total costs for justice-related issues. The funds for penitential administration increased slightly from 2018 up to 2019, about 17 million Euro, but it remained below 2,9 billion Euro.




Figure 5: Total Costs of Justice
Elaboration on official Data https://www.giustizia.it/giustizia/it/mg_1_14.page



2.3 THE COST OF UNEMPLOYMENT

As described in D9.2 “the situation of the unemployment rates partially improved for the first time in 2018, with the persisting exceptions of Southern European countries (except Portugal), Sweden, Finland and France, where more than 13% of migrants were still unemployed in 2018. If we look at the educational level, overqualification seems to be one of the most common features of migrants’ employment conditions. The phenomenon involves 2,9 million highly educated immigrants in the EU out of a total share of 11 million people. In addition, 2,4 million are unemployed. Taken together in both areas, this is almost 45% of the highly educated immigrant population whose formal qualifications are not – or not fully – used, compared with the 30% of the highly educated native-born EU”.

In Italy, in 2019 the number of migrants employed were 2,505 million (10,7% of the total workforce in Italy). The unemployment rate has increased among EU migrants (14%, +0,5 points between 2018 and 2019), while it decreased among non-EU migrants (13,8%, -0,5% points). The inactivity rate of migrants from non-EU countries is around 30,2%, while for migrants from EU countries it is around 26,9% (Italian Ministry of Labour and Social Policies, 2019).

2.3.1 SOCIAL MEASURES TO CUSHION THE EFFECTS OF UNEMPLOYMENT

The Italian system provides a variety of unemployment support measures for all the workers and specifically for migrant workers: Redundancy funds (Cassa Integrazione guadagni), Mobility Allowance (Indennità di Mobilità), Self-worker unemployment benefit (NASpI-Nuova Assicurazione Sociale per l’impiego) and Agriculture unemployment benefits (Indennità agricola di disoccupazione)².

All the social intervention measures mentioned above cover the entirety of the salary lost by the worker due to the suspension or reduction of production activity or after a dismissal³. The economic integration is temporary and covers 80% of the ordinary wage, whereas it is 40% in the case of agricultural unemployment benefit. In 2019, more than 6 million workers asked for social measures including Italians, EU migrants and non-EU migrants; they were potential beneficiaries but only 3 million people obtained the financial state aid. If we take a look at the average salaries of migrant workers⁴ we can calculate the average amount of financial state aid for unemployed migrants. According to recent statistics, the average monthly income of a migrant in fields other than agricultural and domestic sectors is equal to 1,158 Euro compared to the average of 1,483 Euro for Italians, 21,9% less (IDOS, 2019 report). Moreover, the average agricultural worker wage is only 7,504 Euro per year; and among those who work in families, it is about 7,687 Euro per year.

2.3.2 REDUNDANCY FUNDS

In 2019, 52,060 migrants benefited from ordinary redundancy funds treatments; as it is shown in figure 6, out of 415,780 total beneficiaries of ordinary redundancy funds (64,6%) and 172,302 (26,8%) beneficiare of extraordinary redundancy funds, non-EU citizens who receive the ordinary funds represent 8% (49,972 are men and 2,088 women); whereas, on the total of redundancy funds (both ordinary and extraordinary) benefits, non-EU migrants who receive the extraordinary redundancy funds were 3,721 (0,6%).

²<https://www.inps.it/nuovoportaleinps/default.aspx?itemdir=49971>

³ The official statistics (Ministry of Labour, 2019) don’t mention the difference between migrants in general and the Italian population but the distinction is made on non-EU migrants, EU-migrants and Italian beneficiaries. It is worth considering that the percentage here represented and reported were available only for non-EU migrants who are considered part of a system that differs from the one for European migrants.

⁴ Please note that migrant workers considered here are people from a country other than EU countries.




Figure 6: Beneficiaries of Ordinary and Extraordinary Redundancy Funds

Elaboration on official data: <https://www.lavoro.gov.it/temi-e-priorita/occupazione/Pagine/Studi-e-statistiche.aspx>

The ordinary and extraordinary redundancy funds are temporary benefits that are aimed at helping migrant workers involved in industrial and commercial activities with an economic integration for no more than 24 months. Considering that the average annual wage of migrant workers in the industrial field is stated to be 1000 Euro, 80% of the wage would be 800 Euro.

Out of 415,780 total beneficiaries, 52,060 migrant workers asked for unemployment benefits: considering the average migrant worker wage, we can use it as a proxy and estimate that every worker asked for 800 Euro for 12 months, that is 9,600 Euro for one year. In 2019, the financial annual state aid for migrant workers was 500 million Euro for ordinary wage treatment. For the extraordinary wage treatment, out of 172,302 total beneficiaries, 3,721 migrant workers obtained it; considering 800 Euro for 12 months, and the same amount of 9,600 Euro per year, the financial aid was 36 million Euro.

Out of the total 588,082 included in ordinary and extraordinary redundancy funds beneficiaries, migrant workers were 55,781 (9% of the total); finally, considering each single cost per year (36 million Euro for Extraordinary wage treatment and 500 million euro for ordinary wage treatment) it can be estimated that the total financial state aid for non-EU migrant workers is about 536 million Euro.

2.3.3 MOBILITY ALLOWANCE

In 2019, 17,025 workers received the mobility allowance, of which 328 migrant workers (only 1,9% of the total, see figure 7); compared to 2018, the total number of beneficiaries of this service decreased (-71%). This effect is mainly due to the abrogation of the mobility allowance from 1 January 2017 (Law n ° 92/2012), and the institution of a new social allowance (*indennità in deroga*).

Only employees and-self-employed workers can receive the mobility allowance. Considering the average wage of migrant workers, the mobility allowance is 80% of it; if we consider that 328 migrant workers have obtained 80% of the wage for 12 months, we can assess that one migrant worker asked for 9,600 Euro per year. The total financial aid provided by the state in one year for the mobility allowance for migrant workers was about 3 million Euro.




Figure 7: Number of Mobility Allowance Beneficiaries

Elaboration on official data: <https://www.lavoro.gov.it/temi-e-priorita/occupazione/Pagine/Studi-e-statistiche.aspx>

2.3.4 NASpI AND AGRICULTURAL UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFIT

Out of the 2,734,477 beneficiaries of the unemployment benefit received by self-workers (NASpI) , 13,8% are migrants from non-EU countries (377,424 workers) (see figure 8). In 2019, Albania, Ukraine, Morocco and Moldova were the four countries of origin in which there were almost half of the beneficiaries (45%). The NASpI is about 80% of the average wage.




Figure 8: Total NASpI Beneficiaries and non-EU migrant beneficiaries

Elaboration on official data: <https://www.lavoro.gov.it/temi-e-priorita/occupazione/Pagine/Studi-e-statistiche.aspx>

Out of 2 million workers, about 400,000 migrant workers asked for NASpI; they asked for economic integration of 80% of the wage for 12 months. If we consider that each migrant worker asked for 9,600 Euro per year, the total financial state aid for the NASpI, was about 3 billion Euro.

2.3.5 AGRICULTURAL UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFIT

The latest official statistic for the Agricultural unemployment benefits is for the year 2018 (last year of survey): 542,343 workers have received the state benefit (see figure 9). The incidence of migrant workers among beneficiaries of agricultural unemployment is higher than those in other fields: in 2018 they were 90,936 (16,8%). In the case of the agricultural unemployment benefit, the average wage is lower than in other fields: around 600 Euro per month. Agricultural employees could require 40% of their wage, that is 240 Euro per month and 2,880 Euro per year. Considering that circa 90,000 migrant workers received financial aid per year, the total financial aid provided by the state for the agricultural unemployment benefit was circa 300 million Euro per year.




Figure 9: Agricultural Benefit Beneficiaries

Elaboration on official data: <https://www.lavoro.gov.it/temi-e-priorita/occupazione/Pagine/Studi-e-statistiche.aspx>

Total cost of unemployment benefits

In conclusion, having depicted the single cost for each social measure, it is possible to estimate the total financial aid provided by the state for all unemployed migrants. Considering that redundancy funds are approximately 536 Million Euro; the NASpI- Unemployment benefits about 3 Billion Euro; Mobility allowance about 3 million Euro and Agricultural benefits about 300 Million Euro, the total financial aid provided for migrant workers was 4 billion Euro, 13% of the total aid provided for all unemployed persons in Italy. On one hand, social measures provided by the state to migrant workers have a small impact on the total, on the other hand, in 2019, 600,000 migrant workers continued to work off the books, and without a regular permit. According to official statistics (Moressa,2019), over 2,6 billion Euro is the income “produced” by migrants who work irregularly and thus cannot and do not ask for financial aid from the state and per migrant, at least 3,000 Euro in taxes are lost per year. If we consider those numbers, the social measures helping migrant workers could rise generously. Moreover, in 2019, the cost of the permit of stay has risen (from 200 up to 250 euros) and this may be considered an economic obstacle for migrants who want to remain regularly in Italy. Usually, irregular, and undocumented migrants, according to Italian Law on migration, should be repatriated. However, the process of repatriation is very difficult and a part of undocumented migrants who are not repatriated, continue to stay in Italy, working irregularly, and they are also exposed to a higher risk of marginalization than regular migrants (Villa, 2018). Irregularity is accompanied by the working under criminal control, such as the “caporalato” (illegal hiring), together with the increasing cost of the permit stay that could have, amongst other, impact on the employment and unemployment rate⁵.

⁵ Decreto-Legge n. 113, 4 ottobre 2018); (Legge n. 132, 1 dicembre 2018). It is worth considering that those latest laws are currently changing with possible impact on the Italian migration context in the near future.

2.3.6 LABOUR MARKET AND MIGRANT WOMEN

There is another cost that is not possible to be quantified directly such as the cost of non-integration of migrant women in the workforce, mainly due to their involvement in the care of the family and children. Over the past ten years, in EU countries the employment rate of migrant worker women has risen (3,3%) but this rate continues to be 40% lower than the local women employment rate (OECD 2016; X Report 2019). As it has been stated in D9.2, refugee women are even more vulnerable than others because they “have to be considered as a peculiar case of social marginalization. The employment rate is substantially lower than that of male refugees. After checking for controls, the report notices how education somehow mitigates the employment gap, with the employment rate of high-educated refugee women close to 69%, three points higher than their male counterpart”.

In 2019, according to the latest Italian survey conducted (Ministro del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali-Ministry of Labour and Social Policies Official Report, 2019), the percentage incidence of those women engaged in care activities affected seriously the opportunity to join the labour market. As it is shown in figure 10, out of 100 Italian women between 18 and 64 years, 35,9% declare that they take care of family members, both children and elderly; the percentage is higher (39,1% of interviewees) for EU migrant women between 18 and 64 years old, and for non-EU migrant women (44,9% of interviewees).




Figure 10: Percentage rate of women involved in care activity

Elaboration on official data: <https://www.lavoro.gov.it/temi-e-priorita/occupazione/Pagine/Studi-e-statistiche.aspx>

The more women are involved in care activities, the less they are able to spend time searching for jobs; the opportunity to make use of public support services for care and assistance - such as nurseries, babysitters, kindergartens, playrooms, pre-school or after-school services or other services with the same purpose - for those who have the burden of managing minor children on a daily basis, may facilitate the management of professional commitments and family burdens. Even though more than 50% of migrant women declare that they do not use public or private services for the management of children; more than 30% of non-EU migrant women declare they can't access support structures for care due to economic reasons with a reasonable influence on the employment outcome and with an indirect effect on the costs of care activity of migrant children they have to look after.

Overall, 84% of non-EU migrant women work as domestic workers with an average annual salary between 7,687 and 6,868 Euro. As it has been mentioned above, in 2019, out of 2 million workers, both men and women, approximately 400,000 migrant workers asked for NASpI (Unemployment financial aid by the state for self-employed workers). As it is shown in figure 11 only 7,7% migrant working women received financial aid from the state on the total of 15,4% non-EU migrant beneficiaries and 66,7% other beneficiaries (both Italian and EU foreigners or migrants).




Figure 11: Unemployment Benefit for Category

Elaboration on official data: <https://www.lavoro.gov.it/temi-e-priorita/occupazione/Pagine/Studi-e-statistiche.aspx>

Considering the total number of women beneficiaries, it is possible to compare the cost of unemployment between men and women. If we consider that the majority of women are involved in a domestic job with an average monthly salary of 600 Euro and that 50% of workers (200,000 women) were total beneficiaries of the 80% (480 Euro) of their salary per year (circa 5760 Euro), the state financial aid for women was 1,152 billion Euro. The figure 12 shows that out of 52,060 migrants' beneficiaries from ordinary redundancy funds only 4% (2,088) of beneficiaries were women, whereas 96% (49,972) were men.




Figure 12: Beneficiaries by gender – Redundancy funds

Elaboration on official data: <https://www.lavoro.gov.it/temi-e-priorita/occupazione/Pagine/Studi-e-statistiche.aspx>

In the case of Agricultural employment benefits⁶, out of 90,936 non-EU migrant workers, both men and women, women were circa 17,277: as it is shown in figure 13, male gender were predominant, 81% of men and 19% of women asked for financial state aid; it is also true that migrant women, like migrant men, work irregularly and they are also subjected to frequent injustice (Casella,2017) and they can't ask for any social measures. The average wage in this field was 600 Euro, and workers could ask for 40% of it. The annual financial state aid for women was approximately 50 Million out of 300 million Euro.

⁶ The data are related to 2018, last year of the survey conducted.




Figure 13: Total non-EU migrant beneficiaries - Agricultural Benefit

Elaboration on official data: <https://www.lavoro.gov.it/temi-e-priorita/occupazione/Pagine/Studi-e-statistiche.aspx>

In conclusion, in 2019, the total estimated cost of unemployment and that of all the economic integration for non-EU migrant workers (*i.e.* redundancy funds, NASpI, mobility allowance, Agricultural benefits) was about 4 billion Euro. On an estimated budget of more than 30 billion Euro, the cost of migrant unemployment was 13% of the total. As it is shown in figure 14, less than 20% is dedicated to Ordinary and Extraordinary Redundancy funds and only 0,1% is the cost to support the Mobility Allowance. The highest cost was not surprising for the self-employed worker benefit (78,1%), in fact many workers work temporarily as self-employed workers and then they need unemployment benefits. 7,8% were the costs to support the Agricultural Unemployment benefit, even though migrants in this field are under-represented. According to the latest statistics (Villa M, 2020) over 500,000 migrant workers continue to work irregularly and they cannot ask for any benefit. If we consider those numbers, the social measures helping migrant workers could rise generously.




Figure 14: The costs of Unemployment benefits

(*i.e.* Redundancy funds, Mobility Allowance, Agricultural Benefit, Self-workers benefits)

Elaboration on official data: <https://www.lavoro.gov.it/temi-e-priorita/occupazione/Pagine/Studi-e-statistiche.aspx>

2.4 NON-INTEGRATION OF MIGRANTS AND IMPACT ON SECOND GENERATION: THE COST OF LOW EDUCATIONAL PERFORMANCE

The public costs of education are direct and indirect. The state can support direct costs for the buildings of schools and for schooling costs (i.e teaching salaries, school staff and similar); the state can also support other costs to prevent school drop-outs and to prevent costs of school failure (i.e repetitions, additional years of education). According to OECD report, the total expenditure per student between 6 and 15 years of age is about 70,000 Euro on average across OECD(2019)countries for all the educational background provided for a student from primary up to high secondary schools. European countries spend on average about 8,000 Euro per student at primary, secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary educational institutions and more than 12,000 Euro at tertiary level. On average, Italy spends 67 billion Euro to support direct costs of education, the 7,9% of public spending and 4% of GDP. From an economic perspective, the cost of non-schooling or school failure occurs whenever the costs of attending school exceed the economic benefits of education.

Over the past ten years, in Italy, 17% of 15-year-old students repeated at least one school year, compared to an OECD average of 12%. As it is shown in figure 15 in the school year 2018/2019 out of 8,420,972 about 818,365 students with a non-Italian citizenship attended Italian schools (9,7%), +16,000 compared to 2016/2017 (Caritas-Migrantes 2018/2019)⁷.




Figure 15: Distribution of Italian and Foreigner students (year 2018/2019)

Elaboration on official data: <https://dati.istruzione.it/espscu/index.html?area=anagStu>

The figure 16 shows that there is almost an equal distribution of foreign students between schools: kindergarten has the lowest number of foreign attendees (19,3%), probably due to the fact that foreign parents of migrant children obtain Italian citizenship and consequently, children are registered as Italian too and “disappear” from the statistics; High schools (23,2%) and secondary schools (20,8%) are almost split in two groups, primary schools have the highest number of foreign attendees (36,8%).

⁷<https://dati.istruzione.it/espscu/index.html?area=anagStu>




Figure 16: Distribution of foreigner students in Italian schools
Elaboration on official data: <https://dati.istruzione.it/espescu/index.html?area=anagStu>

OECD (2019) reported that up to 20% of socio-economically disadvantaged students, such as migrants who need to improve their language or struggle to integrate, repeat a grade at least once since they enter primary school, in contrast with only 7% of advantaged students. The gap in learning between natives and migrants at schools could affect the school achievement rate of migrants and their social and labour market outcomes (OECD, 2019; Calmfors and Gassen, 2019). Repeating a grade involves disadvantaged students more than advantaged students and disadvantaged students are 1.5 times more likely to repeat a grade than advantaged students who perform at the same level (OECD-PISA, 2010).

Considering the latest official statistics (MIUR, 2019) in the academic year 2018/2019 out of 8,420,972 students, foreign students represent 9,7% of the total population. Considering only secondary schools, 7% of students (equal to approximately 500,000 students) had to repeat the school year. According to recent analysis the total cost of failures is about 40,000 Euro per student and represents 6,7% of the annual national expenditure for primary and secondary education (OECD-PISA, 2012). According to the latest official statistics (ISTAT, 2018) we can see that, unfortunately, migrant students have a higher degree of school failure compared to their Italian peers. Indeed, the estimated percentage of students with a non-Italian citizenship who don't pass the grade in the secondary schools, is about 27,3% in contrast with 14,3% of Italian students. Therefore, the cost of school failure for foreign students is higher than the one for Italian students and can be seen as a cost of non-integration. In addition, the school failure cost is not limited to the 40,000 Euros of extra cost for the State related to an extra school of teaching, but brings also a loss of income for the state when the entry of the failed student into the labour market is deferred.

In addition, a family per year could spend more than 1,000 Euro per student for private lessons. (Indeed, if we consider that, on average, a private lesson costs about 15-20 Euro per hour, two times a week per one year, the cost is over 1,000 Euro). But in case of economic disadvantages of a family, many students don't have the opportunity to take private lessons, don't complete their scholastic training and they struggle to enter the job market. Moreover, leaving school early means that students lack the skills they need in today's job market, says the OECD. Those more likely to underperform or leave school without qualification are most often from poor or immigrant families or have poorly educated parents. Disadvantaged students who struggle academically may not have the same access to early support and more effective remedial opportunities as advantaged students, so repeating a grade becomes the only alternative for them. Migrant students are also more likely to attend schools with fewer resources, and their parents generally cannot afford private tutoring and they end up dropping out of school. This means more unemployed and marginalised young people in the recent future. Completing secondary education guarantees a better integration into the labour market: the percentage of employment, in fact, is about 29,1% among those with primary education, 41,2% among those with secondary education and 36,5% among those with university education (Devillanova, 2018).



2.5 MIGRANTS HEALTH: THE COST OF EXCLUSION FROM THE HEALTHCARE SYSTEM POINT OF VIEW

As analysed in D9.2 migrants tend to interact with the public health system less frequently than Italians but, often, due to the lack of access to prevention care they recur to E.R. in a rate higher than the Italian counterparts. At the same time and for the same reason, migrant women have more preterm birth and higher rates of pregnancy-related issues. These could represent costs related to non-integration as they are due to lack of information and lack of interaction with available public services. It is extremely difficult to quantify these costs as the available statistics do not support this kind of analysis.

Therefore, in order to map the health-related costs of non-integration we will focus on a subgroup of migrants, the irregular new. Indeed, statistics on this population are available. It is important, however, to consider that these costs are an under-representation of the phenomenon.

Speaking about irregular migrants, it is worth considering that we take into account the condition of "irregularity" because irregular migrants are not only the one without a permit of stay or a registered residence, but also migrants in need of healthcare assistance but that don't find the way to be registered in the National Health system because of bureaucratic complications or delays in the health system inscription which compromise their position; considering that, when they ask for assistance they are considered as "irregular". From this point of view, it is only possible to estimate the cost of non-integration in sense of "exclusion" from healthcare assistance but that can affect regular and irregular migrants. In addition we consider that many vulnerable migrants (*i.e.* refugees) are not aware how to be registered in the National Health System and they ask for help to the Welcoming centres that offer this kind of assistance, with a different cost for the Public Expenditure.

It is worth considering that irregular migrants who don't have any permit to stay in Italy or that are not asylum seekers, have the right to receive assistance if they are in need. In fact, the government defines a national minimum statutory benefits package - the "essential levels of care" (livelli essenziali di assistenza, or LEAs, to be offered to all the people in every region for free or subject to copayments) (C-HM/OIM, 2016) for all persons in the country despite their legal status.

2.5.1 RESIDENT AND NON-RESIDENT MIGRANT HEALTHCARE

Migrants with a registered residence or a permit of stay have access to public healthcare services with the Italian National Health System (Servizio Sanitario Nazionale-SSN) by requiring the national health card; also asylum-seekers can register in the health system and receive healthcare. The art. 21 Legislative Decree 142/2015 provides that applicants for international protection have access to health care in accordance with article 34 of the legislative decree of 25 July 1998, n. 286. All the asylum seekers who are entitled to International Protection have the right to be registered in the National health System with equal treatment and full equality of rights and duties with respect to Italian citizens. Even in the absence of registered residence, but in possession of an alpha-numerical tax code and a documentation certifying the applicant status (coupon, form C3, certificate of name, residence permit), the asylum seeker can be registered with the National Health System, for the entire duration of the residence permit, renewable and without interruption of assistance, until the definition of their practice (registration is not lapses when the residence permit is renewed). In particular, the Law 132/18 introduced new types of residence permits, for which compulsory registration to the National Health System, equal treatment and full equality of rights and duties with respect to Italian citizens is expressly guaranteed.

Over the past ten years the data and research studies available on migrants' healthcare costs were focused on the analysis of hospitalization demand of the migrant population to assess the use frequency of health care assistance. The data collected shows that there are no recent studies available to assess the progressive changing in healthcare access; despite this lack, it was possible to make a data comparison about health conditions and accessibility to health services of migrants in Italy. It is feasible to recur to the annual hospitalization rate to compare the frequency of use of hospital services over the years. The data available shows that in 2019, 5,5%

was for Ordinary Recovery and 5% in Day Hospital. The percentages above mentioned have been stable over the past years as it is shown in figure 17; respectively, the ordinary hospitalization rate was 4,6% and 3,7% in day Hospital in 2011 (IDOS, 2011), only 0,9% more in Ordinary Recovery and 1,8% more in Day Hospital.




Figure 17: Regular migrants Hospitalization Rate (2011-2019)

Elaboration on official Data: <https://www.migrantes.it/xxviii-rapporto-immigrazione-caritas-migrantes/>

The migrant population in Italy has constantly increased over the past five years to about 280,000 people⁸; nevertheless, the rate of hospitalization has continued to be lower for migrants than for Italians, on the average of population. The difference between hospitalizations rate during the years amongst the average migrant population, is a sign of a weak use of hospital services amongst the migrant population due to different factors: economic, bureaucratic or linguistic reasons that are difficult to overcome for migrants. It is also true that the migrant population is mainly made of young women and men; according to ISTAT (2018), on the average, 60% migrant men and women who arrive in Italy are between 18-40-years-old; 32 years-old is the average age for women against 28 years-old for men. Considering that, they might have lower needs of healthcare assistance compared to the rest of the population but it is also true that the increasing number of resident migrants over the past five years and the progressive stabilization carried along a phenomenon of aging of migrant population too with consequence of healthcare assistance. In addition, the main causes of hospitalization continue to be traumatism for migrant men and births for migrant women.

According to the research studies available (Morandi I, 2013) about 2 Billion Euro have been spent annually on migrant's healthcare in the Italian regional healthcare systems. Looking at the figure 18, 3,3% (more than 1 billion Euro) of the total costs can be attributed to resident migrants and 0,3% (about 160,000 Euro) to non-residents migrants who are to be considered as part of the "irregular" migrants. In particular, the subdivision between resident and non-resident migrants from PFFM (i.e EU and non-EU countries with a high migrants flow/Paesi a Forte Pressione Migratoria) and Italian citizens and other foreigners PSA (i.e Foreigners from High developed countries/ Paesi di Sviluppo Avanzato) is worth to be considered because in terms of sustainability for the Italian NHS, migrants seems to be not a real "cost" because they consume about 3% out of total resources available which are estimated to be more than 46 billion Euro only for ordinary and urgencial hospitalization Recoveries.

⁸ <http://demo.istat.it/>




Figure 18 : The costs of resident and non-resident migrant’s healthcare

Elaboration on official data: <https://www.agenas.gov.it/>

After determining the expenditure for hospital admissions by type of hospitalization, it is also possible to estimate the unitary expenditure of recovery. It is possible to estimate the expenditure for each hospitalization, comparing the expenditure of each population group to the relative number of hospitalizations (Morandi, 2013); as it is shown in figure 19 the average cost is 3,990 Euro for PSA foreigners whereas the average expenditure per hospitalization of PFPM Regular migrants, both resident and non-resident, is lower than that of PSA , respectively 3,024 Euro for resident migrants and 3,758 Euro per non Resident migrants, which is considered as to be the average expenditure for a broad kind of migrants (*i.e.* irregular migrants)⁹.




Figure 19: Average cost per single hospitalization

Elaboration on official data: <https://www.agenas.gov.it/>

⁹ PFPM resident and non-resident migrants are migrants who come from EU and non-EU countries with a high migrant’s flow/Paesi a Forte Pressione Migratoria; other foreigners PSA (*i.e.* Foreigners from High developed countries/ Peasi di Sviluppo Avanzato)

2.5.2 IRREGULAR AND VULNERABLE MIGRANTS HEALTHCARE

On the one hand, it is true that the migrant population is a young population with limited needs but on the other, it is also true that there is a number vulnerable migrants continue to be supported by other public institutions such as the reception centres part of the SPRAR/SIPROMI system¹⁰, with other costs for the state. The Foundation on Initiatives and Studies on Multi-ethnicity (ISMU)¹¹ estimated the number of irregular migrants living in Italy over the past five years: 350,000 irregular migrants were on the Italian territory on January 1st, 2015. If we look at the figure 20, we can clearly see that up to 533,000 irregular migrants are supposed to be present at the beginning of 2018, an increasing number of 129,000 irregular migrants arrived in Italy between 2015-2018. It is worth considering that to be "irregular" is also a temporary condition deriving from many types of irregularities (temporary permits and expired tourist visas, unauthorized entries by land, and so on); so that, the number recorded is not only referred to the landings recorded between 1 January 2015 and April 2019. In fact, landings are only one of the different types of irregularities as already specified.




Figure 20: Number of Irregular migrants (years 2015-2019)

Elaboration on Official Data: <https://www.ismu.org/chiarimenti-numero-immigrati-irregolari/>

According to recent statistics (Villa *et al*, 2020), the number of irregular migrants could increase over 70,000 people out of 670,000 irregular migrants in the recent future with serious problems for the public institutions that deal with irregular migrant health issues, offering their support and services. In Italy it can be estimated that in the last five years, 0,3% of the resources of a single Italian region were destined to support irregular migrants healthcare (Carletti, 2010)¹². Nationally, more than 10% was destined to irregular migrants but the number of irregular migrants has risen in the past ten years and the Hospitalization rate may have been influenced by this new flow. There are no recent studies available so the cost could only be estimated. In particular, it is worth considering that irregular migrants find themselves in difficult situations characterized by exploitation, insecurity, and a constant fear of entering into conflict with the law.

Their health is a key issue from several perspectives because the majority of irregular migrants do not have health insurance and many of them don't work or if they work they do not have the right to ask for public insurance, as they are employed without formal contracts, so they are systematically excluded from the mainstream health care

¹⁰ The SPRAR project (Protection System for Refugees and Asylum Seekers) is an institutional system supported by the Ministry for the Interior through the National Fund for Asylum Policy and Services; SPRAR system aims at supporting and protecting asylum seekers, refugees and immigrants who fall under other forms of humanitarian protection.

¹¹ Centre for migration, ISMU, <https://www.ismu.org/chiarimenti-numero-immigrati-irregolari/>

¹² In the research methodology, it has been made a subdivision between resident and non-resident migrants from PFPM (i.e. EU and non-EU countries with a high migrants flow/Paesi a Forte Pressione Migratoria) and Italian citizens and other foreigners PSA (i.e. Foreigners from High developed countries/ Paesi di Sviluppo Avanzato)

system. If they don't go to the hospital they mainly ask support to private or other institutional entities such as the SPRAR/SIPROMI welcoming system for migrants, who do not comply with the residence permit to whom essential assistance must be guaranteed (Calderozzi *et al*, 2018). Healthcare assistance to vulnerable migrants is supported by the National Fund for asylum policies and services projects (FNPSA) that in 2018 financed 877 projects in 1,189 Italian Municipalities for a total cost of more than 500 million Euro. It is a supporting social and cultural network that gives the opportunity to over 20,000 migrant beneficiaries to find healthcare assistance. Looking at the figure 21, inscription to NHS and the General Practitioner services were the most frequent demand of healthcare assistance (28%) followed by Specific Examinations (19%) and Health checkup (16%). A few migrants were in need for Psychological or Psychiatric Help (7%) and for a Mental Health Recovery Programme (1%), even though this number does not represent migrants in urgent need of psychological help, who flee from their homeland and arrive by the sea and are assisted by NGOs and other humanitarian organizations on Italian soil in the hotspot centres.




Figure 21 Migrants Beneficiaries of Health Assistance SPRAR/SIPROMI (2018)

Elaboration on official data: <https://www.siproimi.it/>

According to the research studies available (Carletti *et al*, 2008; Morandi *et al*, 2013) over 2 Billion Euro have been spent annually on migrants healthcare in the Italian regional healthcare systems and so they have been distributed: 3,3% is to be attributed to resident migrants and 0,3% to non-residents migrants. It is worth considering that only 0,3% or more can be considered as a real cost of non-integration if we consider non-resident migrants as part of "irregular" immigrants who might ask for medical care without being registered in the National Italian Health System; we consider non-resident migrants also as the one that have to renew their permit of stay. The shift in the renewal of bureaucratic documentation can compromise the regular access to the Healthcare System. As it is shown in figure 22, from 2015 to 2019, National Healthcare expenditure¹³ has been about 140-150 Billion Euro with an impact on GDP about 8%.

¹³ Healthcare expenditure quantifies the economic resources dedicated to health functions, excluding capital investment. Healthcare expenditure concerns itself primarily with healthcare goods and services that are consumed by resident units, irrespective of where that consumption takes place (it may be in the rest of the world) or who is paying for it (EUROSTAT)




Figure 22 : Total Healthcare Expenditure (years 2015-2018) ¹⁴

Elaboration on official data: <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/tps00207/default/table?lang=en>

On the total costs for health, it should be considered that this figure is based on the economic resources allocated to health services without considering the hospitalizations rate of the population; indeed, if we approach a different analysis related to the ordinary and extraordinary needs of healthcare assistance of the population the expenditure for the national healthcare would be up to 40 Billion Euro (Morandi *et al*, 2013).

On a total public healthcare expenditure of more than 40 Billion Euro, migrants consume the 3% or less out of total resources available for ordinary and urgent hospitalization but it is true that on a total of 2 billion Euro destined to support regular migrants' healthcost, another 0,3% is destined in public structures to help irregular and over 500 million Euro to help vulnerable migrants (FNSA 2019). If we look at the figure 23 we can clearly see more than half of the budget is absorbed by regular resident migrants (about 70% of the total resources) but a significant number of resources has been allocated to support irregular migrants and vulnerable migrants (about 10%) and a few of them to assure healthcare assistance to non-resident migrants (6%).

Finally, over 40 Billion Euro for the healthcare assistance of the population, it is possible to say that about 2 Billion Euro has been the national expenditure to help Regular Migrants and non-Resident Migrants; more than 500 Million to help vulnerable and irregular migrants. The final cost for the migrants healthcare support may increase up to 2 billion euro a year but the cost of "exclusion" from healthcare is relatively high considering that irregular migrants are not registered and it is not possible to extensively estimate a bigger picture of the final cost; so the cost of non-integration related to non-resident migrants and irregular migrants is more than 600 Million Euro.

¹⁴ Please note that the Unit of Measures of the Figure is Thousand Euro.




Figure 23 : Migrants Healthcare costs for each category

Elaboration on official data: <https://www.agenas.gov.it/>

2.6 NON-INTEGRATION AND CULTURAL IMPACTS

Cultural integration phenomena interact in significant ways with how resources are allocated and redistributed in society, integration patterns of immigrants may therefore have important implications for economic and political outcomes in society. Ethnic minorities and immigrants are often subject of different kind of discrimination that can hinder inclusion in the host society and create disparities in the access to investment and job opportunities (Doleac *et al*, 2013; Stefan *et al*, 2018; Algan *et al*, 2012).

On one hand, discrimination and in particular ethnic discrimination that affects different fields such as education, labour and housing markets has been highlighted and analysed in many research studies in the context of European Union (Oreopoulos, 2011; Ewens *at al*, 2014; Darolia *et al*, 2011); on the other hand, it is well-know that discrimination can affect national economic outcomes but few research studies has been carried out on the relation between prejudices, discrimination based on ethnicity and relevant economic scenarios (Stefan *et al*, 2018). Due to the lack of studies about the cost of discrimination, the cost can be only estimated and it is possible to analyse and quantify the economic impact of discrimination considering the different factors above mentioned: work, education, housing, health, etc.

The data shown in figure 24 represent the percentage of people who are subjected to discrimination phenomena in Italy. According to EUROSTAT¹⁵, in 2018, the Inequality of Income Distribution (Income Quintile Share Ratio)¹⁶ was 6%; this percentage compares the share of income of the population, mainly the 20% of the population with the highest income to that received by the 20% of the population with the lowest income. Compared with the medium EU Income Quintile share ratio (5%) more people are at risk of poverty and social exclusion in Italy: over 20% of the total of the population is at risk of poverty, both adults and children and at risk of material and social

¹⁵https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database?p_p_id=NavTreeportletprod_WAR_NavTreeportletprod_INSTANCE_nPqeVbPXRmWQ&p_p_lifecycle=0&p_p_state=normal&p_p_mode=view&p_p_col_id=column-2&p_p_col_pos=2&p_p_col_count=3

¹⁶ Income must be understood as equivalised disposable income. The equivalised disposable income is the total income of a household, after tax and other deductions, that is available for spending or saving, divided by the number of household members converted into equalised adults; household members are equalised or made equivalent by weighting each according to their age, using the so-called modified OECD equivalence scale. The indicator is based on the EU-SILC (statistics on income, social inclusion and living conditions).

deprivation. Over 10%, both men and women, are in-work¹⁷ risk of poverty and almost 15% children over the total of the population are at risk of poverty or are early leavers from education. Discrimination affects also psychological and health conditions of employed persons, indeed over 7% declared they were subjected to discrimination in the workplace.




Figure 24: Discrimination Percentage in Education, Work, Age, and Inequality Income Distribution

Elaboration on official Data: <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/>

Discrimination has impact both on direct and indirect cost for the state. Direct costs are influenced by the low economic income from people discriminated against which generate a lower entrance in terms of tax contribution. Indirect costs depend on the labour outcome of people discriminated in the workplace; indeed, a lower productivity may have a negative effect on the final outcome compensation (Stefan *et al*, 2018; Riach and Rich, 2002). Even if it is difficult to determine a specific cost of discrimination for the state, it is possible to say that both direct and indirect costs are high (OECD,2016). In addition, when discrimination involves under-represented minorities such as migrants, this cost is an indirect cost with an increasing impact on the final economic scenario (Bayer, 2014; Phelps, 1972; Carlsson, 2007).

International Research studies (Alden, 2016; Altonji, 1999, Asiedu, 2012; Doleac, 2016) have analysed the impact of discrimination on economic outcome; by examining the behavior of consumer related to different skin colour sellers, researchers estimates that there is a strong evidence that non-white sellers suffer worse market outcomes than their white counterparts in the US and it depends also on the environment considered. In a highly competitive job market, discrimination indirectly affects the economic outcome: "Discrimination is greater in markets in which black and white residents are geographically isolated from one another and in markets with high property crime rates. This is consistent with statistical discrimination used to avoid a fraudulent, inconvenient, or dangerous sale, although it is also possible that animus against black sellers is higher in high-crime or high-isolation markets. We also find evidence that black sellers do better in markets with larger black populations, suggesting that the disparities may be driven, in part, by buyers' preference for own-race sellers". (Doleac, 2016).

Indirect costs are high because the lower well-being affects the productivity of the person involved in discrimination phenomena. In particular, discrimination has effects on health, productivity, and resiliency of individuals. International studies carried out research on the correlation between health condition and discrimination (Smith *et al.*, 2005; Jasinskaja-Lahti *et al.*, 2006); a major exposure to discrimination has been linked with higher levels of blood pressure, depression and anxiety, and lower psychological well-being. The physical and mental problems will impact negatively on the companies and on the economic scenario mainly

¹⁷ In-work Individuals (18-64) are classified as employed according to their most frequent activity status but they are at risk of poverty when they work for over half of the year and when their equivalised yearly disposable household income is below 60% of the national household median income level, (Eurostat; <http://www.europeanrights.eu/>)

because of possible increased levels of absenteeism, a lower performance ability and commitment, and higher job turnover, with higher health costs for the state in the long-term.

It is worth considering that in Italy the expenditure for guaranteeing social measures is up to 50% of the public spending, over 400 Billion Euro; more than 22% was used for healthcare assistance and only about 4% of a single municipality is used for migrants' healthcare and social inclusion (ISTAT, 2019).

On a total direct cost for social measures, indirect costs such as discrimination gender gap and discrimination based on ethnicity may have increased the cost of social expenditure over the years: 1,9% increase between 2009 and 2019 of public resources being used for social assistance and most of the resources has been destined to guarantee social measures to cushion unemployment, housing-related needs and social exclusion. We can imagine indirect costs related to ethnic discrimination have an impact on the economy of the state with a significant cost only comparing it to gender-based discrimination in social institutions. According to OECD (2016), gender-based discrimination costs over 12 Billion Euro for the global European economy. Reducing discrimination in social institutions could lead to an annual average increase in the world GDP growth rate of 0,03 to 0,6% by 2030.

2.7 THE COST OF RECEPTION

The cost of reception is considered as a cost of integration; in fact it is a direct cost that together with the cost for the sea rescue operations, the cost for bureaucratic and other costs for the welcoming of migrants (i.e. healthcare, education, professional training) are included directly in the public spending. In addition, the costs of reception are financed by public national expenditure and by European Union Funds; there are different European funds available for helping refugees and migrants. Considering that, we can take into account the ESF (The European Social Fund)¹⁸ and the ERDF (The European Regional Development Fund): they are aimed at helping member states in the process of integration of migrants and asylum seekers through investments in social, health, education, housing and childcare.

The Italian reception system for the welcoming of refugees and unaccompanied minors is known as the SPRAR-SIPROMI system^{19,20}. The welcoming of refugees is structured in three phases: the first phase is the "reception" where the rescue and the first assistance is supported; then, the bureaucratic recognition and identification of the migrant is made, also a recognition of psychic or psychological trauma is part of the first step of welcoming. In the second phase migrants are supported in the process of integration in the host context, and they can stay for a certain period of time in temporary welcoming centres such as the Extraordinary Reception Centers (CAS) and Reception Centers for Asylum Seekers (CARA/CPSA) before entering in the SPRAR welcoming centre. According to the latest National Law on Migration (Decreto Salvini 2018²¹) on the one hand, the length of stay in the First Reception Center has been lengthened from 90 up to a maximum of 180 days; on the other, only migrants who are entitled of International Protections can be part of the SPRAR system reception centre, and the Humanitarian

¹⁸ The ESF can support many activities aimed at promoting the integration of asylum seekers into the market network. For example, it can provide funding for training, language courses, consultancy, coaching and training professionals.

¹⁹ The reception system follows the guideline under the umbrella of the "National Plan to deal with the extraordinary flow of non-EU citizens, adults, families and unaccompanied foreign minors", defined at the Unified Conference of July 10, 2014 and then implemented in Legislative Decree (DL) 142/20151.

²⁰ The updated law on immigration and Public security provides a changing in international protection and immigration, public security, as well as measures for the functionality of the Ministry of the Interior and the organization and functioning of the National Agency for the administration and destination of confiscated goods and properties from criminal organizations (Disposizioni urgenti in materia di protezione internazionale e immigrazione, sicurezza pubblica, nonché misure per la funzionalità del Ministero dell'interno e l'organizzazione e il funzionamento dell'Agenzia nazionale per l'amministrazione e la destinazione dei beni sequestrati e confiscati alla criminalità organizzata), www.interno.gov.it D.L 4 Ottobre 2018, n.113.

²¹ The updated law on immigration and Public security provides a changing in international protection and immigration, public security, as well as measures for the functionality of the Ministry of the Interior and the organization and functioning of the National Agency for the administration and destination of confiscated goods and properties from criminal organizations (Disposizioni urgenti in materia di protezione internazionale e immigrazione, sicurezza pubblica, nonché misure per la funzionalità del Ministero dell'interno e l'organizzazione e il funzionamento dell'Agenzia nazionale per l'amministrazione e la destinazione dei beni sequestrati e confiscati alla criminalità organizzata), www.interno.gov.it D.L 4 Ottobre 2018, n.113. In addition, the law on Immigration and Public security (Decreto Sicurezza) is now changing again so it is possible that other modifications of the stated situation will be done in the near future.

Protection has been cancelled. In addition, the Italian citizenship of naturalised Italians who commit crimes can be revoked.

Following the consistent landings linked to the North Africa Emergency, the number of available places in the SPRAR network increased up to 10,000 in 2012, and continued to grow, marking a significant acceleration for the entire subsequent period - with an average annual growth rate of 53,4%, compared to 16,6% per year for the period 2003-2012 (Caldarozzi, 2018).

Despite the presence of 35,000 available places in 2018, the SPRAR structures had a limited capacity to welcome all the refugees coming from the sea rescue operations, in fact the SPRAR welcoming centres were able to host no more than 20% of refugees arriving from the sea. Making a recognition of numbers (see figure 25), from 2014 up to 2018 the arrival of migrants in the welcoming structures has seen an increasing trend, from 66,083 at the end of 2014 to over 170,000 at the end of 2018, with a peak up to 183,000 in September 2017²².




Figure 25: Number of Refugees arrivals from the sea-years 2014-2018

Elaboration on official data: www.gov.it

Amongst the refugees, there have been a significant part of vulnerable migrants such as unaccompanied minors (around 25,000 in 2016 and over 15,000 in 2017) and a growing number of asylum seekers (123,000 people in 2016 and around 130,000 in 2017).

In figure 26 it is recorded the number of asylum seekers plus the overall number of migrants who arrive from the sea. The hotspots centre are for the first welcoming migrants who arrive by the sea and they can be migrants without protection or asylum seekers. In particular, in the hotspot migrants receive first health-aid assistance, and then they are identified as asylum seekers and sent to other temporary Centres (CARA/CPSA Centre for Asylum Seekers Reception). When asylum seekers are entitled to Humanitarian or other Protection, recognised as refugees, they move into the SPRAR Centres (Welcoming centres for Refugees and Unaccompanied Minors). Migrants who flee from their countries and arrive by the sea but are not entitled to any Protection are temporarily allocated in the CAS (Centre for Extraordinary Reception)²³.

In 2016, the hotspots centres, hosted, over the year, 820 people, against 119 people in 2017 and 453 people in 2018; clearly, the highest number of asylum seekers and migrants were hosted over the years in temporary host centres (CARA/CPSA Centre for Asylum Seekers Reception) and in the Centre for Extraordinary Reception (CAS) with an increasing trend from 2014 (about 35,499 people) up to 148,502 in 2017. The overall number of refugees

²²<https://www.interno.gov.it/it/stampa-e-comunicazione/dati-e-statistiche/sbarchi-e-accoglienza-dei-migranti-tutti-i-dati>

²³ There are other Reception Centres (Centri per il Rimpatrio/CPR) have substituted the CIE-Centre for Identification and Expulsions(Centri di Identificazione e Espulsione) but have not been mentioned in the description of this chapter.

welcomed in the SPRAR centres as well as the refugees welcomed in temporary private or public centres have been almost constant.




Figure 26: Number of migrants in the welcoming centres, years 2014-2018

Elaboration on official data: www.gov.it

According to the official data (MEF, 2018) in 2017 the public costs of reception were over 4 Billion Euro, and in 2018, the estimated budget was about 5 Billion Euro; it represented 0,02% of GDP in 2017 and 0,04% of GDP in 2018. The total public expenditure covered the following unitary costs: as you can see in figure 27, much of the economic and financial resources covered Reception and welcoming costs (68,8%) whereas less than 20% was for the rescue operations (18%) and for Healthcare and Education(13,2%).




Figure 27 : Unitary cost of services in the SPRAR system

Elaboration on official data: www.gov.it

Welcoming centres financed by the state places cannot afford an emergency crisis as in the past years, and places are not always available for all the refugees. Many of them are allocated into the extraordinary reception system

(CAS). They are temporary solutions in which, according to recent statistics (UNHCR, 2016) the cost of welcoming and reception is about 35 Euro per day.

As mentioned, the welcoming centres into the SPRAR system are financed 95% by the public national expenditure, which draws resources from the National Fund for Asylum Policies and Services; the government donate sums to local authorities (and not refugees) based on the estimate that, to welcome an adult migrant, welcoming centres need about 35 Euro per day each migrant (45 Euro for unaccompanied minors). These 35 Euro are used for different services: personal and environmental cleaning services; provision of meals; supply of basic necessities (bed linen, clothes, etc.); linguistic and cultural mediation services; there may be other added costs for social and legal assistance services to the person.

2.8 TOWARDS AN ASSESSMENT OF THE TOTAL COST OF NON-INTEGRATION

It is possible to estimate an overall cost of non-integration for adults taking into account different costs mentioned above, such as the Cost of Unemployment Benefit + Cost of Healthcare assistance for Irregular Migrants + Unitary cost of daily Imprisonment. If we consider the Unitary cost for each of the costs mentioned, we can calculate the Total Cost (TC) of non-integration and then, we can estimate an overall total cost. Firstly, we will have that:

Unitary cost of Unemployment (U) + Unitary cost of Healthcare Assistance for Irregular Migrants (H) + Unitary cost of Imprisonment (D) = Total Cost (TC)

$$(U + H + D = TC)$$

We determine the Total Cost from estimated single cost mentioned in each costs framework: U = 9,000 Euro; H = 3,000 Euro; D=40,000 Euro so putting it into a formula means:

$$9,000 (U) + 3,000 (H) + 40,000 (D) = \mathbf{52,000 \text{ Euros (TC)}}.$$

We can say that 52,000 Euro is an estimated total cost related to the cost of non-integration of a migrant who is unemployed for one year, or he/she is imprisoned for one year and seeking health assistance once in a year.

It is worth considering that the estimated cost refers to a small percentage of non-integrated migrants who have to deal with all the difficult situations above mentioned such as unemployment, healthcare assistance and imprisonment. Indeed, integration itself embraces different areas (*i.e.* economic, social inclusion, political and civic inclusion) and it is possible, in a few cases, that a migrant who doesn't find a job ends up in a period of imprisonment, and also he/she struggles to find healthcare assistance. Whereas the above mentioned Total Cost is representative of different factual situations, it is worth considering that the unitary cost of failure of a young migrant who doesn't pass the grade will be about 40,000 Euro per year and it is another cost of non-integration in a charge of the state referred to a young migrant or second generation children. This cost could add up to the other possible costs considering a long and particularly difficult, integration process.

Overall, it is also possible to estimate a Total Cost considering all the factual situations mentioned above by collecting the number of migrants who receive unemployment benefits per year, the number of irregular migrants who receive health care assistance, the number of foreigners imprisoned per one year.

Out of a total of more than 2 Million of people asking for unemployment benefits, the estimated number of migrants who asked for benefits is about 500,000. Out of a total Healthcare expenditure of 46 Billion Euro, non-resident migrants seeking for healthcare assistance has been estimated to be 10% over 630,000 irregular migrants, so we can say they would be about 63,000 people²⁵; finally, imprisoned foreigners have stated to be about 20,000 people.

²⁴ This is the annual cost of imprisonment considering the daily cost of 131 Euro.

²⁵ This percentage has been estimated considering that in recent research studies available (Carletti, 2010) the number of irregular migrants who seek healthcare assistance in each Italian region have been estimated around 0.3%. even though this number may underrepresented the factual numbers of irregular migrants who ask for healthcare assistance, due to a lack of bureaucratic and statistical updated documents. In fact, irregular migrants are considered the one who are not resident and are not allowed to be registered with Italian National Health System (SSN-Servizio Sanitario Nazionale) and for that reason they are considered "irregular" because they seek for healthcare assistance (*i.e.* day urgencial or ordinary Hospitalizations) but they are not regularly beneficiaries of healthcare assistance and depend on the Public National Expenditure for Health; it is provided by the General Law that each individual can ask



The final Total Cost (TC) will be made up of five single voices per the portion of the migrant population to whom the single cost is referred: Unemployment Benefit (U) x Number of Migrant beneficiaries reported in a year + Cost of Healthcare Assistance Irregular Migrants (H) x Number of Irregular Migrants who seek for Assistance once in year + Unitary cost of daily Detention (D) x Number of Detained Foreigners in a year, the result would be:

$$(U) \times 500,000 + (H) \times 63,000 + (D) \times 20,000 = (TC)$$

by inserting the economic unitary value, we would then have:

$$(9,000 \times 500,000) + (3,000 \times 63,000) + (40,000 \times 20,000) = (TC)$$

$$4,500,000,000 + 189,000,000 + 800,000,000 = \mathbf{5,489,000,000 \text{ Euros (TC)}}$$

The results must be considered per one year and the total cost of non-integration depending on national expenditure would be over **5 Billion Euro**.

On one hand, considering that from 2015 up to 2019 (DEMO/ISTAT) over 280,000 migrants have started to be stable residents in Italy, there have been major requests for healthcare and social assistance; on the other, the number of resident migrants not fully employed and the number of student with non-Italian citizenships increased too with an impact on the total cost of failure and on the cost of unemployment benefits used to cover more demand of assistance. Not only resident migrants have increased over the years but also irregular migrants and it is possible that this number will continue to rise in the next future with a future impact on the cost of unemployment, healthcare assistance to irregular migrants and imprisonment.

As it has been stated in D9.2, it is possible to compare the cost of non-integration for the other two pilot countries. Considering that on the average, GDP (Gross Domestic Product) is the same in the case of Italy and Spain (about 1500 Billion Euro the Spanish GDP, and 1700 Billion Euro the Italian GDP) and in the case of Greece is instead less in front of Spain and Italy (about 200 Billion Euro), it is evident that in the case of Spain and Italy the costs of non-integration would be estimated on a same average whereas for Greece, there would be a different national expenditure and a deviance from the average cost of non-integration of Italy and Spain. Greece, Spain and Italy have also a different number of the total population; it is worth considering that the National expenditure for healthcare, Education and the total cost of non-integration could be influenced by the total number of population in each country; in fact, Italian population is about 60 Million people, Spanish population about 50 Million people and Greek population about 10 Million people.

According to EUROSTAT²⁶, the Spanish national expenditure for healthcare is about 100 Billion Euro per year, a few less than the average spending of Italian state (about 150 Billion Euro per year); while the Greek national expenditure by financing scheme is about 14 Billion Euro so if we consider an increasing pressure on healthcare assistance, there would be a major cost of non-integration to deal with in the case of Greek national health expenditure in front of the other two countries. In relation with the national expenditure for education, the public national Italian expenditure is about 60 Billion per year, in the case of Spain it is estimated to be about 100 Billion Euro and in Greece, about 6 Billion Euro. Saying that, it is possible to estimate that the cost of failure of a migrant student would have less impact on the national Spanish expenditure than the other two pilot countries, if the primary educational economic resources spent are estimated to be about 50% more than the other two countries.

for public healthcare assistance according to the LEA (Minimum Level of Assistance-Livelli Essenziali di Assistenza). Considering the number of irregular migrants, according to recent statistics (Villa M. 2020) is about or more 630.000 people. if a small number of non-resident migrants (0.3%) in each Italian region ask for healthcare assistance, it is possible to estimate that 10% seek healthcare assistance; about 63,000 people (6-10%) irregular migrants ask for public healthcare assistance and then they receive it.

²⁶ the data statistics are referred to 2018, source:

https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/hlth_sha11_hf/default/table?lang=en

3 PRELIMINARY IMPACT ASSESSMENT ON LOCAL SERVICE PROVIDERS

In the previous chapter we analysed the costs of migrants' non-integration from the point of view of public spending. The findings support the idea of investing in measures and tools, such as REBUILD, for improving migrants and refugees integration and, by doing so, reducing costs related to unemployment or underemployment, health costs that could be reduced if the migrants and refugees are able to access prevention and first aid services, etc.

To a certain extent, the analysis carried out, represents part of the ex-ante scenario: i.e. the situation without REBUILD, but it is at macro, national level. We do not expect REBUILD, being a 3 years project, to impact on macro socio-economic statistics but we are interested in showcasing the areas and the micro impact that can affect the overall picture at social level.

This chapter considers more micro dimensions and focuses on the actual and expected impact of REBUILD as a project and as a socio-technical solution on REBUILD partners acting as LSPs (UNINETTUNO, CIDAS and OMNES) or facilitating their engagement (UAB and MDAT).

The information included in this chapter has been gathered through online interviews (one for each partner), based on a semi-structured questionnaire (see Annex 1). The questionnaire represents the operationalisation of the methodological framework described in D9.1 and briefly summarized in this report in chapter 1.

The interviews were carried out between July and September 2020. Organisations received the questionnaire in advance to be able to prepare for the interview. Each interview lasted between an hour and a half and two hours and was recorded. Each partner was represented by at least 2 persons and this gave the opportunity to consider complementary views within the same organisation.

3.1 SOCIAL IMPACT

With reference to social impact the first dimension investigated was the ***Impact on workforce human capital***. It was asked first the impact of the REBUILD project on the team engaged in it actively in a regular way and then the impact on the teams that will be using the REBUILD socio-technical solution once available.

With reference to the first point all the interviewed persons describe a positive impact of the project on their team and the acquisition of new knowledge and competence. More specifically improvement in personnel human capital was observed on the following topics

- co-creation, user-centric design, and design thinking
- research processes, especially related to research design and data gathering, data management, GDPR-related best practices, ethics of research
- Team building
- European project administration management

Increased understanding of the ICT development processes was mentioned as an area of skill acquisition by the CIDAS team, indeed the team had a mainly humanistic training background before the project started, so the project has been an occasion for new learning. Other teams, that were already quite advanced on ICT literacy, usage and also design mentioned in any case an improvement or change in mindset. This was the case of OMNES, which mentioned an increased attention for the digitalisation of internal-to-the-organisation processes as a result of the engagement in the process and also a high attention in supporting migrants and refugees in acquiring digital skills. Also, for UAB the project made possible a more interdisciplinary understanding of the ICT development process and practices.

UAB and UNINETTUNO also mentioned an increased understanding of the migration process and related socio-economic and legal aspects.

I grew up from an emotional perspective: understanding better the life of migrants, the different types of migration and their stories.

The project also helped the team partners to exchange knowledge and competencies within their teams, a larger sharing of know-how thanks to the different activities performed in the project that include research, co-design, communication, and management.

With reference to the partners teams that will use the REBUILD socio-technical solution, all those interviewed mentioned that it will be positively or extremely positively welcomed and seen as a tool for improving the work and the support provided to migrants. Training is seen as needed but to a limited extent (few hours on the functionalities of the platform) so that the cost for training is estimated as low.

In the cases of UNINETTUNO and CIDAS the possibility to use the REBUILD application with several of their internal teams is envisioned with a clear potential for spill-over effect using and adapting the REBUILD solutions in/to different service provisions processes.

Another important dimension is the **Impact on collaboration and networking**. As for the previous dimension, also in this case the answers have been all positive even if with different emphasis. The project helped partners in:

- enlarging their international network of collaboration
- enlarging their networks at local level with other LSPs
- improving the collaboration within already existing collaboration links

Out of the new collaborations at least three international project proposals emerged so far.

The collaboration with REBUILD sister projects was often mentioned as very positive and promising both at local and international level.

"The balance between the local and the international level of the activities is very interesting and enriching"

The interaction with local public authorities emerges as more complex in some contexts, but it is expected to improve in the next months when the REBUILD socio-technical solution will be tested and will become more tangible for the local stakeholder.

The covid-19 emergency emerged as a relevant factor supporting a higher usage of ICT by LSPs and public administration staff: this led to a quick change within several organisations with very low use of technology before the covid-19 situation. Also, the attention and perception of utility of REBUILD changes in the view of many stakeholders that have appreciated its potentialities.

3.2 ECONOMIC IMPACT

Under the economic impact area, the dimensions **Impact on efficiency** and **Impact on internal working routine & work processes** were considered as linked. Indeed, at this stage of project development the two aspects go hand in hand.

For CIDAS the REBUILD solution will represent a tool for increasing efficiency by supporting their team in accessing in a more efficient and effective way the needed information and being able to provide those information to the final users, being migrants and refugees, in a more precise, timely and up to date way. This is true for different services offered by CIDAS, not only those directly linked with migrant first integration but also supporting long-term foreign residency in interacting with the public administration and, finally, to support educators and other operators offering services to the general population (i.e. after school clubs) that are not "used" also by migrant families and their children.



OMNES too sees, in the near future, an increase in efficiency linked to the time and effort saving during their daily activities in supporting migrants and refugees, a central aspect being the need to find translators and ask for their support, operations that will be facilitated by the REBUILD app. An estimation was made: OMNES takes care of 121 families and spends a large amount of time (2-3 weeks approximately on a yearly base) finding the right interpreter, have them in touch with the family, support the information retrieval and similar. So, the time saving introduced by REBUILD could have a significant economic impact on the OMNES organization.

UNINETTUNO is positive in envisioning an increment in digitalisation of their services and linked to this, an increment in efficiency. Envisioned cost saving and time saving are linked to the capability, offered by REBUILD, to make semi-automatic processes that are now manual. As for the case of CIDAS, REBUILD components could be applied to different services offered by UNINETTUNO, not only those directly addressing migrants and refugees, and in this way support innovation of different services and collaboration among different sectors within the organisation.

REBUILD is also seen by the respondents as a means for internal innovation and for increasing the organisation's **competitiveness**. This is linked to the positive return on image of participating in an H2020 project, in the capability of designing a solution that answers to the specific needs of the organisations and of the final users and is also linked to the increased networks mentioned in the previous paragraph.

Impact on employment is something that will possibly become more evident in the future but two out of the five interviewed saw already an enlargement of their staff as a result of the project and the additional resources are expected to become permanent staff also after the end of the project.

3.3 POLITICAL IMPACT

Political impact will be explored by looking at impacts on the political agenda setting at local, national and international level; the generation of new policies; impact on the quality of existing and new policies and impact on the institutions, promoting, when useful, institutional changes.

All these aspects will be touched only in the next months of the project when activities targeting policy makers and civil servants directly will become more relevant. At the same time, the expectations of the interview partners for the future are different as some municipalities seem more open to innovation and changes than others. The general view at the moment, is, however, that it is too early to explore possible policy impact. Areas of policy innovation mentioned are, however, not only migration policies but also eGovernment.

Also the actual relationship between migrants and refugees on one side and public administration on the other side appear different in the three countries, which of course influence the perception migrants and refugees have of such institutions and set a different Ex-ante situation. Indeed, in Bologna (Italy) the perception migrants have of public institutions is very positive, while in Greece migrants and refugees experience many difficulties in interacting with the public actors, especially due to language barriers. The situation in Spain is somehow in between as the migrants tend to interact with intermediate actors, such as NGOs and Charities with whom the relationship is very positive, and they minimize the contacts with the public administration. When migrants are in direct contact with public service institutions, like a hospital, the relationship is more problematic.

3.4 TECHNOLOGICAL IMPACT

Under the area technological impact, **Impact on services' digitalisation** and **Impact on access to information** are considered. As mentioned in the previous paragraph the level of digitalisation of the REBUILD partners is different and so are the specific expectations in terms of technological impact. For all of them, however, LSPs will experience an increment in the digitalisation of their service and in the integration of different services.

Also, in terms of accessing information the main impacts are expected in information integration more than access to totally new data and in the reduction of data duplication.



4 CONCLUSIONS

This report added more information to the ex-ante scenario for the REBUILD impact assessment, i.e. the situation without REBUILD. It did so by analysing the costs of non-integration of migrants and refugees and by describing the impacts, already visible and expected, on REBUILD partners organisations.

The analysis presented in this report shows that the costs for a migrant that is not properly integrated in the host society can be as high as 52.000 Euro per Year for a single person, reaching 5 billion Euros of costs considering the whole migrant population.

This figure is an estimation and further studies would be needed in order to develop a more precise cost for the different migration and integration paths of migrants and refugees in Italy and Europe, but it helps in giving an overall view of the enormous costs that could be avoided, or reduced, with a more effective integration. Exactly in this field the REBUILD socio-technical solution came into play. A better communication between migrants/refugees and public administration and LSPs could lead to a more effective access to health services; a better support on migrant training and language learning can help in supporting their employability and, more generally, integrated persons tend to have a much lower rate of deviant behaviours that could lead to imprisonment.

The next steps of the impact assessment activities will be that of gathering more information on the impact of the REBUILD socio-technical solution on LSPs and final users during the testing phase which is about to start and follow its implementation process from this specific point of view.

D9.4 "REBUILD socioeconomic impact assessment, final version" , due by the end of the project, will apply the methodology developed in D9.1 - partially used for this report too - and will report all the socio-economic, technological and political impact of REBUILD and will support the development of the exploitation strategy.

ANNEX - INTERVIEW OUTLINE (FOR REBUILD PARTNERS)

Dimension	Sub-dimension	
Impact on workforce human capital	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Digital literacy</i> • <i>Acquisition of new skills besides the ICT-related ones</i> 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Considering the team working on REBUILD in your organisation, do you think the participation to the project increased their ICT competences? If yes, how? 2. Did they acquire any other competence besides the ICT-related ones? If yes, which ones? 3. Now, consider the team that will be impacted by the REBUILD App, if and when fully deployed. do you think the engagement with it will increase their ICT competences? If yes, how? 4. Will additional training be needed for them in order to adjust to the changes related to the REBUILD app? If yes, how much would this cost for your organisation? 5. Will they acquire any other competence besides the ICT-related ones? If yes, which ones?
Impact on collaboration and networking	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Increased collaboration with other LSPs at local level</i> • <i>Increased collaboration at national and international level</i> 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 6. Can you describe the collaboration you have with other LSPs working on migrants and refugee's integration? 7. Did the participation to REBUILD so far, have an impact on your collaboration? If yes, how? 8. Will this happen in the future? If yes, how? 9. Did participating in REBUILD project increase your collaboration at national and international level? If yes, how? 10. What do you expect on this for the future?
Impact on efficiency Impact on internal working routine & work processes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Cost saving for services offered</i> • <i>Time saving for services offered</i> 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 11. How will REBUILD change the internal working routines? 12. Do you expect a time saving? If yes, how? Can you quantify it? 13. Do you expect a cost saving? If yes, how? Can you quantify it? 14. Overall, do you think REBUILD will increase your organisation efficiency? To what extent? 15. Reduction of bureaucracy

		<p>16. Reduction of duplication of data collection and storage</p> <p>17. Increment in accountability and transparency</p>
<p>Impact on workforce working conditions</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Impact on perceived quality of job</i> • <i>Impact on personal perceived efficacy</i> 	<p>18. Considering the point of view of the persons that will interact with REBUILD, how do you think it will be welcomed?</p> <p>19. Do you think they will perceive it as a tool able to improve the quality of their job? Will it be transparent to them? Will it constitute a boarder for them?</p> <p>20. Do you think they will perceive an increment in their efficiency?</p>
<p>Impact on competitiveness</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Increased visibility and recognition at local/national and international level</i> • <i>Impact on innovativeness</i> 	<p>21. Do you think the participation in REBUILD increased the visibility and recognition of your organisation at local/national and international level? If yes, how?</p> <p>22. Do you think this will happen in the next phases of the project and ones the REBUILD app will be released?</p> <p>23. Do you think REBUILD had an impact on your organisation innovativeness? Please consider the 10 innovation models in the figure 1.</p> <p>24. Will this happen in the future?</p>
<p>Impact on services' digitalisation</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Increase in the number of services digitalised</i> • <i>Increase in the quality of (e-) services offered</i> • <i>Investment in ICT hardware/software</i> 	<p>25. Please describe the level of digitalisation of your organisation considering Fig.2</p> <p>26. Do you think that the introduction of the REBUILD app will increase the level of digitalisation of your organisation? If yes, how?</p> <p>27. Will it increase the number of services digitalised?</p> <p>28. Will increase the quality of (e-)services already offered? If yes, how?</p> <p>29. Did REBUILD influence your organisation investments' in ICT hardware and software? If yes, how?</p> <p>30. Will this happen in the future? If yes, how?</p>

		<p>31. Considering now other LSPs you are engaging with because of REBUILD, do you think it will have an impact on their level of digitalisation?</p> <p>32. Do you expect a local digital ecosystem to emerge out of the REBUILD project? If yes, please describe what is there now and how do you expect this to change.</p>
Impact on policies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Impact on the local/national policy agenda setting</i> • <i>New policies</i> • <i>Quality of new policies</i> 	<p>33. Do you expect REBUILD to impact on local/national policy agenda setting? If yes how?</p> <p>34. What are the activities you are carrying out/planning in order this to happen?</p> <p>35. Do you expect new policies to be developed as a result of the REBUILD project?</p> <p>36. Do you expect REBUILD to impact the quality of current or new policies?</p>
Impact on institutions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Institutional change</i> • <i>Improved public image</i> 	<p>37. Do you think that REBUILD will influence migration-related institutions? If yes how?</p> <p>38. Do you think REBUILD will improve the public image of those institutions?</p> <p>39. Will migrants using REBUILD change their perception of the organisation they currently interact with?</p> <p>40. Will migrants using REBUILD change their perception of your organisation?</p>
Impact on access to information	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Access to more information (information not available before)</i> • <i>Access to better quality information</i> 	<p>41. Is REBUILD providing you access to data/information not available before?</p> <p>42. Is REBUILD providing to migrants, information not available to them before? If yes, what kind of information? How relevant for their integration?</p> <p>43. Is REBUILD increasing the quality of the data/information available to your organisation?</p>

Table 1: Interview Outline




Figure 28: 10 Types of innovation

Source: <https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/ch/Documents/consumer-business/ch-cip-en-swiss-transformation.pdf>




Figure 29 : The Cisco ladder of ICT adoption—modified to include digital ecosystems (Dini and Nachira 2007)



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